...KAWA
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...RATIVE ASSISTANT

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COMMITTEES:
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY
FOREIGN RELATIONS
SMALL BUSINESS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY E Schmelzer DATE 7/2/85
RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT DATE
REASON(S)
EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY ☐
EXCISABLE ☑

September 28, 1981

8128285

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

My Dear Mr. President:

According to this morning's Post, the Saudis do not seem enthusiastic about receiving a U.S. mission to discuss changes in the terms of the sale to them of military equipment, including AWACS. I hope that this Saudi position is not fixed, and that they will be glad to negotiate changes in the agreement when they realize the difficulties of getting congressional approval of the sale as it now appears to stand.

Senator John Glenn has taken a deep interest in the technical aspects of the sale. I myself have thought long and hard about the historical, cultural and strategic aspects. If a mission is to be sent to Saudi Arabia to negotiate changes in the terms of the sale, I would like very much to be included in the delegation.

I want Saudi Arabia to have adequate defenses. But I do not wish to increase Israel's fears. Both are surrounded by enemies, real and potential. A deal must be worked out to make both nations feel more secure--and thereby relieve tensions in the entire Middle East.

I believe I can be impartial and fair in disputes between the Israeli and the Saudis. Against the background of an emotional attachment to Jewish friends all my life and my strong interest in the welfare of Israel, I spoke before the Jewish Federation Council of Los Angeles on March 30, 1978, to announce for the first time my position in favor of the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia. It was a rough evening, but they finally thanked me for my courtesy and candor in letting them be the first to know of my conclusions.

I enclose my public statement on the subject of the AWACS sales to Saudi Arabia of September 22. It is something of an advance from my earlier statement of June 18, also enclosed.

I would be grateful to be included in further discussions of this difficult and urgent matter.

Respectfully,

S. I. Hayakawa

Enclosures

Copy to: ✓Secretary Haig
Secretary Weinberger
Mr. Richard Allen
Senator Baker
Senator Percy

U.S. Senator S. I. Hayakawa 8128285

California

September 22, 1981

STATEMENT BY U. S. SENATOR S. I. HAYAKAWA ON THE PROPOSED SALE OF AWACS AIRCRAFT TO SAUDI ARABIA

On Monday, September 14, Mr. Richard Allen, the President's National Security Advisor, and his technical experts, came to my office to discuss with me the proposed sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia. I expressed my concerns over the matter and submitted a number of questions to him. Mr. Allen promised to get back to me with the answers. At the close of our meeting, I felt that he was aware of my deep reservations; he indicated that he would communicate them to the President.

As I said in my statement of June 18, I was concerned over U. S. security in these areas. Will the AWACS be secure in Saudi hands? Will technical manuals get lost and diverted? Will we offer these planes in their most sophisticated version or strip them down? Are the AWACS planes superior to anything the Russians have yet built? In the event of a crisis in Saudi Arabia, will we be able to get these planes back before they fall into unfriendly hands, as so much sensitive equipment did during the revolution in Iran? Will we have access to the information the planes generate? Will U. S. crews aboard the planes be protected from becoming targets in an Arab-Israeli conflict?

The more people I have talked to, within the Congress and the Administration, the more questions I have. I am disturbed at the direction we are taking. It seems to me that this whole matter has come down to a yes or no issue, with no alternatives or compromises being considered. The result is bound to be victory for one side and humiliation for the other -- the U. S. being the loser in either case.

- MORE -

I think the nation of Israel is among our best friends; I think Saudi Arabia and its present regime are also among our best friends. But the Administration is confronting us with a choice that is bound to alienate one or the other. That is why the package as it stands today is extremely difficult to accept. It is vital that we use the next few weeks to discuss alternatives, including diplomatic initiatives by one or more of the contending parties.

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U.S. Senator S. I. Hayakawa

8128286

California

STATEMENT ON THE PROPOSED PACKAGE OF ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA

LOS ANGELES, JUNE 18, 1981 - Sometime next month the Administration will ask Congress to approve a major package of arms sales to Saudi Arabia. The package is said to include enhancements for the F-15 fighter-bombers the Saudis ordered in 1978 and five AWACS radar planes to be delivered in 1985. Congress will be asked to weigh the security needs of the Saudis, whom we number among our friends in the Middle East, against our own interests and those of the Israelis, who are allies as well as friends.

I am deeply disturbed at the implications of this sale on the security of Israel, and I am not convinced that is in Saudi Arabia's long-term interest to buy these planes. And I am not at all sure that is in our interest to sell them. I have communicated my concern to the Administration, and I hope that the actual proposal will address these problems, because I cannot support the proposal as it was described based on Administration statements to the press.

Let me list some of the problems.

Israel is a small nation surrounded to the south, east and north by hostile neighbors. In episodic warfare over the last 30 years its foes have attacked and retreated or been driven back, but Israel has nowhere to retreat; it has it's back against the sea. Thus its military security rests on superior preparedness, will and vigilance. The AWACS plane in Saudi hands could be used to command an Arab attack against Israel and to reduce the effectiveness of Israeli air defense.

Furthermore, the Saudis have repeatedly called for "jihad" against Israel. While they say that by "holy war" they also mean political, ideological and economic conflict, they specifically refuse to rule out force. The Saudis continue to oppose the Camp David Treaty and the search for comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

Nor am I convinced that the Saudis truly need the AWACS planes. First of all, they cannot operate or maintain them, so they would continue to use U.S. advisors. To attempt to train Saudi replacements in the complicated AWACS technology is a drain of talent that small nation can ill afford. And continuing dependence on American advisors may be a political burden for the Saudi monarchy both domestically and within the Arab world.

Some analysts suspect the Saudis are interested in the AWACS primarily as a symbol to show the rest of the Arab world their clout with the United States and to silence radical Arab critics who say the Saudis sell us too much oil and get too little in return. If that is true, it may be for them a very expensive symbol. Better that we provide them useful arms to secure their own borders and perhaps, as former CIA director Stansfield Turner has suggested, accelerate the delivery of the F-15's we have already agreed to sell, than provide a strategic weapon intended for use in regional warfare.

Third is a U.S. security question. The AWACS planes represent the ultimate in U.S. radar, computer and anti-jamming technology, and they are superior to

anything the Russians have yet built. Will they be secure in Saudi hands? Or will technical manuals get "lost" and diverted? Will we offer these planes in their most sophisticated version, or strip them down? In the event of a crisis in Saudi Arabia, will we be able to get these planes back before they fall into unfriendly hands, as so much sensitive equipment did during the revolution in Iran? Will we have access to the information the planes generate? Will U.S. crews on board the planes be protected from becoming targets in an Arab-Israeli conflict?

I am sympathetic to the Reagan Administration's desire to see that the Saudi Kingdom is strong and that the U.S. develop a ground-based presence in the Middle East, which such a sale might help us to develop. But I do not believe that the AWACS sale is an appropriate move in that direction.

Nevertheless, I believe I owe it to the President and the Administration, whose policies I have fully supported since they took office, to examine the full catalog of the items to be included in the arms sale to Saudi Arabia, and to listen thoughtfully to their reasoning in this matter, especially as regards the AWACS.

Meanwhile, you know where I stand now.

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